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State, Economy  
and Development in Kenya
Hervé Maupeu
Translated by Devon Winters, Ana de Oliveira & Daniel Persia
Since the 1960s, Kenya has been regarded as a bastion of capitalism. Kenyan 
elites have been relatively consistent in their vision of development, 
particularly with regards to the role that the state should play; indeed, as 
in other African countries, the public sector has always been a key driver 
of development. By “state,” we mean first and foremost an institutional 
or otherwise legal reality, which brings together within a single entity 
(internationally recognised) the structures of the three major powers 
(the executive, the legislative and the judiciary), the administration and 
ministries. This type of definition makes it possible to take some distance 
from the dominant Weberian approaches that emphasise the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force over a territory and the exclusively bureaucratic 
characteristics of the administration. The Kenyan state has never perfectly 
controlled the entirety of its national space and the bureaucratic practices 
of administrative services coexist with neo-patrimonial dynamics. 
Tim Kelsall (2013, 12) presents the paradoxical nature of this mode of 
governance as such:
The system is held together by the personal distribution of material resources 
and perks (many of which are ‘rents’ in modern economic terminology) 
distributed and consumed as though they were the private property of the ruler 
and/or his staff. ‘Neo-patrimonialism’ refers to a political economy in which 
the basic authority system is combined with, or exists behind, some formal, 
impersonal elements of governance, such as a legal system that demarcates the 
public and private domain, or an administrative code with formal criteria for 
staff hiring and promotion.
The ways in which the state works, notably in relation to the 
different economic sectors, are also affected if not determined by the 
forms of democratisation that shape the country. Thus, in recent years, 
electoral democracy has been supplemented by institutions and practices 
characteristic of control or surveillance democracies. It means, following 
Pierre Rosanvallon, that the multiplication of independent authorities 
responsible for fighting corruption, the organisation of counter-powers 
between the various political institutions, and the improvement of the 
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independence of the judiciary have given more legibility to the action of 
the state, yet without eliminating patron-client practices, as we shall see.
Under the leadership of East Africa’s most elaborate—and certainly 
most efficient—state, Kenya’s economy has changed significantly since 
independence. Throughout the 2000s, the economy grew at a strong 
and steady rate (usually above 5% per year), and since 2015 Kenya has 
moved into the lower middle-income bracket (annual income between 
1,046  USD and 4,125  USD).1 But the wealth produced is very unevenly 
distributed. Only 20% of the population makes up the middle class.2 The 
poverty rate (according to ILO criteria) exceeds 40% of the population. 
Most importantly, Kenya ranked 155th out of 188 countries in 2017 on the 
Human Development Index.
This chapter will explain how Kenya has put in place this type of 
economy by tracing the evolution of its economic policies and identifying 
key turning points. The Kenyan state has always been a “developmental 
state,” in the sense that contemporary approaches give to this concept. Thus, 
Laura Routley (2012: 8) considers that “a developmental state has sufficient 
state capacity to be effective in its targeted areas and has a developmental 
vision such that it chooses to use this capacity to work towards economic 
development.”3 We will present the different forms of interventionism of 
a state that has never fell into neither a market economy nor a marked 
liberalism unlike its neighbouring countries.
1. This World Bank classification is defined according to the gross national 
income (GNI) per capita of each country. In 2017, Kenya’s GNI was 3,250 PPP 
USD. There are other typologies that take GDP per capita into account. In 2017, 
Kenya’s GDP was 1,678 USD according to the IMF and 1,507 USD according to 
the World Bank. Tanzania’s GDP per capita was 936 USD and Uganda’s GDP 604 
USD.
2. According to the criteria of the African Development Bank.
3. Routley completes her definition by specifying four characteristic attributes: 
“1- A capable autonomous (but embedded bureaucracy); 2- A political leadership 
oriented towards development; 3- A close, often mutually beneficial symbiotic 
relationship between some state agencies and key industrial capitalists; 4- 
Successful policy interventions which promote growth.” Maia Green (2014, 16) 
thinks that the developmental state must be distinguished from what she calls 
the “development state.” The latter has much worse results in the economic 
and social fields than the first; and it is formed in close interaction with 
international development agencies. According to Green’s criteria, the Kenyan 
state has characteristics of both types of state. Thus, it remains the 6th recipient 
of international aid in Africa (4% of GDP in 2016).
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1. “Patron-Client Capitalism” during the First Decades 
of Independent Kenya (1963–1992)
In the 1960s, all the African countries gaining independence chose sides in 
the cleavage imposed by the Cold War. Those who were behind the United 
States and aimed to pursue a policy of cooperation with the former colonial 
power generally opted for a capitalist political and economic system. Those 
who preferred the Soviet or Chinese paths, or who participated in the non-
aligned movement, moved instead towards a form of socialism. But what 
kind of capitalism and socialism are we talking about? Paul Nugent (2004) 
rightly speaks of “African Socialism” and “Home-Grown Capitalism.” These 
African types of socialism and capitalism differed greatly from Western 
models. Some analysts even believe that in Africa, socialist and capitalist 
regimes functioned in a relatively similar way (with a one-party system, 
marked statism, personalisation of power…). We shall see that, in the 
1980s, the political and economic systems of Kenya (in principle, capitalist) 
and neighbouring Tanzania (that followed socialism known as Ujamaa) 
were actually very similar. Beyond the rhetoric of those in power, these 
regimes can be distinguished by a series of precise criteria. Paul Nugent’s 
frame of reference can help us characterise Kenyan capitalism during this 
period. He focuses on four criteria: the importance given to self-reliance; 
the degree to which the state is perceived as the main vehicle for economic 
growth; the importance given to social equality; and the degree and forms 
of participation of the masses in political processes (Nugent 2004, 142-
143). Drawing upon these elements of differentiation, one can define the 
particularities of the Kenyan system, which, according to Joel Barkan, 
constitutes a “patron-client capitalism” (Barkan 1984; 1994).
Capitalism vs Socialism during the Critical Juncture of the 1960s
Proponents of neo-institutionalism, whether economists or political 
scientists, emphasise the idea of “critical junctures.” There would be 
moments in history of intense institutional change (modification of the 
frame of reference and ground rules) that determine the way economic, 
political and social structures function for the (often long) period that 
follows. Some call this “path dependency” (Collier & Collier 1991). In Africa, 
independence represents one such critical juncture. At that time, Kenya’s 
leaders opted for capitalism but without it seeming to be the obvious or 
only choice available. Jomo Kenyatta long used socialist rhetoric to justify 
his preference for a market economy.4 Two types of arguments have been 
4. It is revealing that the manifesto of the regime of the time is entitled African 
Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (1965). Within the dominant 
party, KANU (Kenya African National Union), a strong minority headed by 
Hervé Maupeu
32
used to explain how the African countries chose between the capitalist 
path and the socialist option. For some, the ideological preferences as 
well as the personality of the Heads of State made it possible to grasp 
these differences.5 For others, the characteristics of the national political 
field at the time of independence conditioned the choices available. In 
the case of Kenya in the 1960s, Joel Barkan emphasises three structural 
variables: the centrality of ethnicity in the political system; a particular 
colonial legacy linked to the fact that Kenya was a settlement colony; 
and the place of the Kenyan economy in East Africa (Barkan 1994, 14–
16). Thus, both political divisions and the party system were organised 
around ethnic identifications. Jomo Kenyatta had to constantly negotiate 
with regional leaders with strong legitimacy. He also had to consider the 
interests of a powerful white community, especially as he could not do 
without British military aid because of the Somali secession attempts 
(Shifta War) of the North-East region and the uncertainties of its army (a 
tentative coup d’état in 1964). Moreover, the country’s economy was the 
most developed and diversified in the region. The Northern Corridor from 
Mombasa supplied the whole of Africa’s Great Lakes region, and since 
colonial times, Nairobi has been an important hub in finance, insurance 
and services. Thus, Kenya has had a competitive advantage in extending 
its capitalist experiment.
Alongside these classical explanations, some specialists try out more 
general theories. This is the case of Leonardo Arriola (2013) who seeks 
to understand why African countries developed very different financial 
systems at the time of independence. Some established access to credit 
monopolised by state-owned banks. They often opted for a socialist 
regime.6 Others preferred more liberal banking systems, with a multiplicity 
of private banks. In this way they marked their predilection for capitalism. 
Arriola argues that when the Founding Father of the nation came from a 
constituency where the economy was based on exports, he favoured the 
proliferation of private banks, while those coming from a non-exporting 
Oginga Odinga argued for a more egalitarian economic system and sought 
support from the Eastern European countries.
5. As early as the 1960s, political scientists brought to light how much African 
regimes relied on the personalisation of power. Nevertheless, from one country 
to another, the Founding Fathers of the nations played more or less important 
roles. All studies on Ujamaa emphasise Julius Nyerere’s role in bringing the 
Tanzanian political system into its socialist path and in defining its particular 
content (Maguire 1969; Pratt 1976; Bjerk 2016). In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta did 
not have the same room for manoeuvre and his biographical analysis is less 
interesting than in the case of Tanzania.
6. This is not always the case (see the case of Cameroon analysed by Arriola).
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constituency insisted on the need for the state to tightly control access to 
credit.7
State and Capitalism during the Kenyatta Era (1963–1978)
Kenya’s initial choice of capitalism is not indicative of its particular form 
because, as we know, capitalism is not the same from one place to another 
(Fulcher 2004, chap. 4; Thelen 2012). If we take Ian Bremmer’s very general 
definition, who considers that capitalism is “the use of wealth to create 
more wealth… and that, in general, in the capitalist economic system, most 
means of production (labour, land and capital) are owned by private actors 
and give rise to trade” (Bremmer 2010, 25), we can imagine how varied 
organisational arrangements can be. Of particular interest to us is the way 
in which the Kenyan state fits into economic relations and organises them 
(or not). In order to characterise these interactions, it is first necessary to 
explain some of the peculiarities of the administrative system of this country 
from the 1960s to the early 1980s. Over this period, the executive considered 
that an administration with marked Weberian characters (hierarchical 
system, bureaucracy, valuing merit and competence, not very corrupt…) 
was a major political asset in so far as it guaranteed its independence from 
local leaders. As soon as he came to power, Jomo Kenyatta abolished the 
federal-type constitutional system and imposed recentralisation based on 
a prefectural-type organisation. He simultaneously organised patron-client 
redistribution by putting notables in competition with each other to be 
elected in relatively free elections. In this respect, he established the basis of 
a representative democracy at constituency level and a rather satisfactory 
rule of law was guaranteed by a particularly efficient administration. In the 
social sciences, such a bureaucratic, autonomous and sovereign “Kenyatta 
state” was promoted by David Leonard (1991). His book presents the 
biographies of four senior officials who successfully led ministries or public 
enterprises. Most of them had started their careers in the colonial era and 
spread the spirit of British-style public service into their administration. 
In fact, the Africanisation of the Kenyan administration was very gradual 
and pragmatic (compared to Tanzania). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
7. This is the first element of Arriola’s theory of the formation of opposition 
coalitions in contemporary Africa. The author thinks that political alternation—
condition of a consolidated democracy—requests the constitution of multi-ethnic 
coalitions of the opposition forces. In political cultures where patronage prevails, 
these coalitions can only occur with the financial support of businessmen who 
engage politically only when their material interests are not directly threatened 
by the ruling elite. According to Arriola, this is only possible in countries where 
access to credit is not politically locked up by the state. These coalitions would 
only be found in countries where many private banks thrive.
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many senior officials of the Kenyatta time published their memoirs. Such 
autobiographies became a particularly popular literary genre in Kenya. 
They promoted the era of prosperity (and of Kikuyu dominance) that the 
Kenyatta period represented in retrospect, especially for those published 
during the economic recession of Moi’s regime (1978–2002).8
It is therefore necessary to explain how this very particular state is 
situated in relation to economic players. To do so, some classic typologies 
produced by the vast field of study of forms of capitalism (or “Varieties 
of Capitalism” scholarship, often known as VofC scholarship)9 are useful. 
They help to clarify what Barkan means by “patron-client capitalism.” In 
the main types of capitalism, a distinction is often main between the social 
model of capitalism, found mainly in Europe and Japan, and the liberal 
model, characteristic of English-speaking countries. It is difficult to compare 
the regulated market economies of Western Europe with the systems in 
place in postcolonial Africa. In Kenya, attempts to develop a welfare state 
has had limited effects. Basic health insurance quickly made it possible 
to cover most of wage earners with varying degrees of effectiveness. The 
public pension system proved to be underperforming, including for civil 
servants.10 Yet, the transition to a liberal system of social protection started 
only in the 1990s after a series of scandals regarding misappropriation 
of social security funds. Following Thelen’s analysis (2014), the European 
systems differ in three crucial levels: (centralised) negotiations on working 
conditions, labour market policies, and (specialised) training and its links 
with the economic world. On the first point, Kenya from the 1940s to the 
1960s had labour unions with strong national federations that had shown 
great capacity to organise long strikes in the workplace (Mombasa strikes) 
and to mobilise on political agendas, especially at the beginning of the Mau 
Mau crisis (Cooper 1996; Durrani 2018). The leaders of independent Kenya 
took it upon themselves to quickly dismantle the power of the unions and 
put them under the control of the single-party state.11 Since then and for 
the most part, working conditions have largely been negotiated at the level 
of each company, using local representative structures. Regarding labour 
market policies, the Kenyan state promoted wage employment, which 
explains why, up to the 1980s, Kenya, along with South Africa, had one of 
8. About how the opposition to the Moi regime used the memory of the “milk 
and honey” era, see Maupeu (2008).
9. See notably Thelen (2014, chap. 1).
10. Munguti, Richard. 2018. “Authority Orders Posta to Pay Ex-workers Billions 
in Pension.” Daily Nation, 26 April. https://nation.africa/kenya/business/posta-
to-pay-4-000-ex-staff-more-benefits-36724 [archive]; Openda, Joseph. 2018. 
“Retired Teachers Resume 18-year Pension Battle.” Daily Nation, 27 July.
11. Only the teachers’ unions have continually retained a strong influence.
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the highest wage rates in Africa. In terms of educational policies, Kenya 
differentiated itself from its neighbours by promoting primary education 
but especially secondary education. It also supported technical training 
supposed to meet the demands of economic actors (Cooksey, Court & 
Makau 1994).
It is thus clear that, from the beginning of independent Kenya, the 
timid push for the development of social capitalism aborted. However, 
it is difficult to speak of “liberal capitalism.” Of course, labour law was 
rather much in line with this type of economic system, but those in power 
were too preoccupied with controlling economic forces to really allow 
a “liberal” system to develop. Is it then “state capitalism” in the sense of 
“a system in which the state plays a leading economic role and uses the 
markets primarily for political gains” (Bremmer 2010, 33)? Today, the 
concept of “state capitalism” is associated with countries such as China or 
Russia, but Bremmer detects forms of state capitalism in African countries 
such as South Africa and Nigeria. To a lesser extent, some characteristic 
elements of this type of capitalism can be found in the Kenyan system of 
the 1960s-1970s, especially if one adds to Bremmer’s definition the idea that 
the state uses the markets for political purposes by using patronage. This 
brings us back to the idea of “patron-client capitalism.” At that time, the 
state intervened strongly in the economy, especially through three types of 
policies: the Africanisation of certain sectors, the redistribution of land, and 
the development of public enterprises.
Firstly, the Africanisation of the economy aimed at reserving certain 
areas for Kenyan citizens, in fact “African,” and excluding economic 
actors from certain communities, particularly Indians, who were forced 
to sell some of their businesses. These measures benefited very specific 
clienteles. For example, many shops on Nairobi’s busy River Road were 
sold to notables from Murang’a, the political stronghold of Dr Julius 
Kiano, the minister in charge of this question. The Kenya National Trading 
Corporation was also working to reserve certain types of imported goods 
to African agents. Again, businessmen of certain communities (in this 
case, Kikuyu and Swahili) are said to have benefited particularly from 
these privileges (Ochieng, 1995). Secondly, the land policy of the Kenyatta 
era has been a major legacy of this regime whose shock waves still carry 
on until this day (Onoma 2010; Joireman 2011; Boone 2014). The Million-
Acre Scheme remains one of the symbols of this policy of redistribution 
of land in the White Highlands. During the British period, some areas of 
the Rift Valley were reserved for white farmers and managed directly by 
the state, while an indirect administration regime prevailed in other parts 
of the country. During the decolonisation negotiations, it was foreseen 
that the settlers could, if they wished, sell their land at a favourable price. 
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Fifteen years later, 95% of these farms had changed ownership. Nearly half 
of this land was subdivided and resold to smallholder families as part of 
settlement schemes. More than a third of these operations benefited the 
Kikuyu.12 This temporarily eased tensions within a community that was 
emerging from a full-blown civil war between different factions—the Mau 
Mau crisis had not just been an anti-colonial war. Throughout the Kenyatta 
era, the various organisations managing the distribution of land kept a 
captive clientele, in particular because no title deeds were distributed, in 
principle until each family had finished paying back its loans. The leaders 
of these groups thus became particularly powerful political entrepreneurs. 
The best known of them was Dixon Kihiga Kimani, the only Kenyan 
politician to be elected in three different constituencies (all in the Rift 
Valley: North Nakuru [1974–1979], West Laikipia [1992–1997], and Molo 
[1997–2002]).13 The Kikuyu were not the only ones to benefit from the 
subdivision of settlers’ farms. There were also Luo, Luhya and Kisii 
settlement schemes, not to mention the ethnic groups that occupied these 
areas when the British arrived. Not surprisingly, the latter (or at least some 
of their dignitaries) felt that all this land had to come back to them. Jean 
Marie Seroney (MP of Tinderet), in particular, mobilised crowds, especially 
during the affirmation of the Nandi Declaration (1969), which proclaimed 
the exclusive right of the Nandi to these territories.14 This earned him 
imprisonment, ending his political career. He was not followed by the key 
Kalenjin leaders whom the Kenyatta regime was clever enough to include 
within the country’s leadership team. Daniel arap Moi was appointed 
Vice-President and many politicians from the region were able to easily 
acquire large estates through loans from state-owned banks—loans that 
were not always repaid. Half of the settlers’ farms were sold off without 
being subdivided, most often to people close to the regime.
Lastly, patronage was pervasive among the many public companies that 
were set up during this period. The public enterprise formula was intended 
to allow more equal access to public goods such as water or electricity. 
These structures were also meant to make certain sectors more attractive, 
12. Leo (1984) estimates that the Kikuyu captured 40% of these territories even 
though they represented about 20% of the Kenya’s total population.
13. Almost until his death in 2004, Dixon Kihiga Kimani was the Kikuyu patron 
of the Rift Valley and served as an intermediary between the Kikuyu of this 
province and the big men of the Central district, which is the cradle of the 
Kikuyu community.
14. It is during this period that the idea of a Kalenjin identity—federating several 
groups of the Rift Valley (in particular, the Nandi, Kipsigis, Pokot, Sebei, Sabaot, 
Keyo, Marakwet and Tugen)—took hold and served as a vehicle for the defence of 
their common interests, particularly in relation to land. See Lynch (2011).
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in particular agriculture. But very quickly, the management positions 
in these public companies became honorary positions to be distributed 
according to the political interests of those in power. The bosses of these 
companies often used their position to develop real patron-client machines 
through which they hired their dependents or those who could be useful to 
them. We will see later that this type of management has had economic and 
political effects, especially from the 1980s.
The analysis of Kenyatta-era capitalism has given rise to much 
discussion, notably what has been called the “Kenyan debate”—one of the 
great controversies of the golden age of academic Marxism. It is difficult 
to summarise without distorting them the dozens of books and the many 
articles published on this subject. At a time when the dependency paradigm 
was dominant in Marxist circles, these scholars asked whether economic 
development was financed by domestic or foreign capital. Michael Cowen 
and Gavin Kitching showed how some African entrepreneurs were able 
to generate surpluses in many agricultural sectors—surpluses they could 
reinvest in different other sectors. Based on research made in the national 
and regional archives, they described the emergence of what they called 
an African petite bourgeoisie (Kitching 1982; Cowen 199615). Other 
authors focused more on postcolonial economy. They described a highly 
inegalitarian development that excluded in particular the peasantry, even 
though the growth relied heavily on agriculture. Essentially, they believed 
that Kenyan entrepreneurs were rather autonomous from international 
capital. These entrepreneurs used the multinationals more than they 
depended on them, often by relying on the normative capacities of the state 
and the negotiation possibilities of the political elites (Leys 1975; Langdon 
1987; Swainson 1987).16
At this point, and especially in desc ibing post-Kenyatta era capitalism 
(after 1978), it is important to refer to debates on the measurement of economic 
growth and its causes. In the early 1980s, talented young economists used 
Kenya as a ground to defend their neo-institutionalist approach. In doing 
15. The major influence of Michael Cowen (1996) mostly relies on the many 
grey literature articles he published in the Working Papers of the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Nairobi, in which he provided 
significant quantitative data on different agricultural sectors during the colonial 
period. The Kenyan debate developed in complement and in dialogue with the 
equally rich “Tanzanian debate” (Shivji 1976; Saul 1979; Hyden 1980, amongst 
many others).
16. The Kenyan debate continued to irrigate contemporary thinking. Dominique 
Connan (2014), in a non-Marxist historical perspective, studied the autonomy 
of current entrepreneurs compared to the autonomy of the state. Lisa Mueller 
(2018) believes that a new middle class—less dependent on the state than the 
previous bourgeoisie—is the essential vector of protest in Africa today.
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so, they opposed the neo-classics, very dominant on American campuses, 
which they criticise for not properly taking institutions into account and 
for not considering the role of politics in the functioning of economies. 
Robert Bates (1981) explained Kenyan prosperity by the fact that its leaders 
refused to give in to the “urban bias,” unlike most other presidents on the 
continent. According to Lipton (1977), African regimes had little legitimacy 
and their state little capacity for action. To preserve their power, these 
regimes were working to meet the immediate needs of the citizens they 
considered the most dangerous and in particular urban dwellers. Thus, they 
sought to artificially lower the price of food by controlling the marketing 
of agricultural goods, thus buying social peace at the cost of impoverishing 
the countryside. Robert Bates believed that countries where elites invested 
heavily in agriculture refused to sacrifice the rural world to the cities. 
Such countries generally opted for a capitalist system. For its part, Morten 
Jerven (2016) advocated for more nuanced conclusions. He showed that 
economic growth rates had so far been relatively poorly calculated (lack of 
reliable data in many sectors; difficulty in comparing between countries, 
notably between Kenya and Tanzania because of different methodologies 
in public statistics…). Above all, he believed that it was difficult to measure 
the economic influence of political regimes. Doing so would necessitate 
differentiating institution by institution and sector by sector. In fact, the 
neo-institutionalists who studied the economic crisis of the 1980s in East 
Africa largely shared these concerns. Bates (1989) described how former 
President Moi skilfully took advantage of the famines that occurred during 
this period to gain control of the grain industry. This branch of agriculture 
struggled to recover after several decades of mismanagement and patronage. 
During the same period, the coffee sector, dominated by the Kikuyu, became 
the target of the Head of State who saw political competition there that he 
needed to counter (Chege 1987; Bart, Charlery de la Masselière & Calas 
1998). This is the period when the economic (and to some extent, political) 
situation of capitalist Kenya and socialist Tanzania were dangerously close 
together. In both countries, public deficits shot up as well as inflation. Over-
employment was high in both states, but the quality of public services was 
deteriorating dramatically as a result of corruption and lack of investment. 
Joel Barkan’s following diagnosis is sound:
In both countries politics took precedence over economics, though for different 
reasons. In both countries the state pursued redistributive policies and 
interfered with the operation of markets, resulting in a dramatic showdown 
of economic growth. In both countries, the ruling elite sought to monopolise 
political power and shackle civil society (Barkan 1994: 21).
A push of authoritarianism then dismantled many democratic gains; and 
international aid—so important in the public budgets of both countries—
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began to dry up. Under pressure from international donors, the two 
neighbours accepted (with great reluctance and lack of sincerity) structural 
adjustment plans and reforms aiming at democratising their regimes.
2. Uncertain Democratisation and Kleptocracy  
during the Second Phase of the Moi Era (1992–2002)
From 1992, the governing elite made concessions and adopted reforms 
that were characteristic of the democratisation process of this period: 
legalisation of multipartyism, recognition of a certain freedom of speech, 
especially in the media, possibility of creating civil society organisations… 
During this transition phase, when the regime was shifting from a type 
of authoritarianism that was not saying its name to a democracy not yet 
consolidated, the economic cost of the political control over the population 
increased tremendously. In order to stay in power, the ruling elite needed 
more material resources at a time when the state had become poorer and 
the national economy was in deep recession. They put in place a mode of 
governance that many analysts have referred to using the term “kleptocracy.” 
This concept proves to be heuristic when we specify its components: high-
level corruption reaches unprecedented levels and diversifies; the political 
control of the economy is accentuated by using largely illegal methods; 
militias often supported by the police intervene violently and terrorise the 
population; structural adjustment plans and state reforms are negotiated 
but poorly implemented, which creates the illusion that the state operates 
in accordance with the modalities in force at an international level. These 
four dynamics make up the system.
Corruption at the highest reaches of the government is nothing new, as 
we have seen. It aimed to finance political life while massively enriching the 
elites—in short, it fuelled neopatrimonialism. Yet, democratisation opened 
up a period of strong uncertainties which incited the governing elite to an 
unprecedented gluttony. The Goldenberg case is the symbol of this practice 
and this period.
In addition, the political class took over many plots of land and public 
buildings. According to Jacqueline M. Klopp (2000), such appropriations were 
a means of finding resources in areas beyond the control of international 
bodies. However, these practices did not go unnoticed and many NGOs and 
other civil society organisations informed the public. Several parliamentary 
committees described the diversity and massive nature of these thefts. 
The Ndungu Land Commission (2003), in particular, highlighted that 
these illegal allocations of public land were made mainly in the 1990s and 
during election periods. It showed that the entire administrative system 
supposed to regulate real estate was involved. The level of corruption in 
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this area was such that all property rights were weakened. Many Kenyans 
had the just feeling that their property title could be challenged at any 
time. Furthermore, banks were aware that many loans were based on 
fragile foundations when their clients gave, as a guarantee, land that the 
Parliamentary Commissions17 showed it was illegally acquired.
The privatisation of public land in a patron-client logic was linked with 
another characteristic of Kenya’s kleptocracy: the use of extremely violent 
militias, especially during election periods. During the 1990s, many areas 
of public forest, particularly in the Mau Forest or on the slopes of Mount 
Elgon, were opened up for settlement for the benefit of populations close 
to the ruling party. At the time of the elections, communities deemed 
favourable to the opposition were massacred or forced to evacuate these 
constituencies (Klopp 2001).18 Their plots of land were often taken over by 
families who voted “correctly.” And this happened in a context where many 
politicians used abundantly the rhetoric of autochthony (against supposed 
allochthons, or foreigners).
During this first decade of democratisation, the very high-ranked 
political elite stood out as essential economic actors. Thus, Moi, Biwott 
and several other Kalenjin politicians bought out the branches of the many 
multinationals that were pulling out of Kenya. They also invested in the 
media, transportation and the petroleum products distribution sector 
(Thomas 1997; 1998). They were suspected of being directly linked to more 
or less illegal traffic, e.g. speculation on sugar imports, especially during 
periods of risk of famine; cultivation and trade in drugs….
These different characteristics of the Kenyan kleptocracy are what 
some have called “criminalisation of the state.”19 Others prefer to speak of 
“informalisation of political life.”20 But these elements of governance were 
complemented by institutional reforms of the state in order to keep the 
17. In addition to the Ndungu Commission, other parliamentary committees 
provided specific indications of misappropriation of public lands. We can 
think in particular of the Njonjo Land Commission (1999) and the Akiwumi 
Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes (1999).
18. In 1992–93, these killings resulted in nearly a thousand deaths and several 
hundred thousand internally displaced persons' (IDPs). These ethnic cleansings 
mostly took place in the Rift Valley, considered the stronghold of the ruling elite 
of President Daniel arap Moi. In 1997–98, several hundred deaths were recorded, 
mostly on the Coast and on the outskirts of the Rift Valley. The lieutenants of 
the regime had understood that the violent technique previously tested by their 
bosses made it easy to win parliamentary elections.
19. See Thomas (1997) who adapts to the Kenyan situation the concept theorised 
by Bayart, Ellis & Hibou (1998).
20. Branch & Cheeseman (2010) use this concept several times but without 
specifying its exact content.
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Box 1: The Goldenberg affair (1990–1992)
In 1990, Kamlesh Pattni, the young heir (he was twenty-five years old) to a 
gold and gem trading business, met James Kanyotu, the head of the Special 
Branch and a very close friend of President Daniel arap Moi. He explained 
that Kenya could export much more gold and thus have access to more 
foreign currency if the state could adopt more incentive policies. Following 
discussions with the Head of State, it was decided that gold exports 
would benefit from public export compensations of 35%. A new company, 
Goldenberg International Limited, co-owned by Kanyotu and Pattni, was 
granted a monopoly over gold and diamond exports (Hornsby, 2012). In 
a country that does not have any diamond reserves and hardly exploits 
gold, this company did not a priori have a promising future. Except that the 
governing elite saw in it the possibility of discreetly diverting public funds 
to finance the general election of 1992. This first multi-party competition 
for decades was expected to be very contested and therefore very expensive.
In the beginning, Goldenberg imported gold that it re-exported by 
overvaluing the volumes traded, but soon it made clearing requests that 
did not correspond to any merchandise. Transactions were done through 
so-called “political” banks that dealt exclusively with the affairs of the 
country’s ruling elite: Trade Bank, Delphis Bank,a and especially the 
Exchange Bank created and owned by Kanyotu and Pattni. According to 
Pattni’s statements during the official investigation in 2004, Goldenberg 
reportedly received nearly 170  million  USD from the state.b Part of this 
sum had been handed to Youth for KANU’92, the lobby group responsible 
for redistributing mone  during the election campaign (Maupeu 2000). The 
entire political class were generously spoiled, including the opposition. For 
example, Oginga Odinga received nearly 20 million KES that was allegedly 
used to finance the Migori and Ndhiwa by-election (Oloo 2007, 116).
The macroeconomic effects of this financial scandal were enormous. 
Daniel Branch sums up the situation perfectly: “Writing in July 1993, John 
Githongo remarked that Goldenberg ‘is shaking the very foundations of 
Kenya’s economy’. The shilling plummeted, losing about half its value against 
sterling in the eighteen months leading up to the public revelations about 
Goldenberg in mid-1993. The increase in money in circulation drove inflation 
to an annual rate of over 40 percent in August 1993” (Branch 2011, 220). 
As early as 1993, the opposition and the media exposed the mechanisms 
of this gigantic corruption case.c The IMF and the World Bank called for a 
public inquiry into the matter. The government rejected this request but the 
Exchange Bank was dissolved and the head of the Central Bank of Kenya 
was replaced. Despite a political changeover in 2002 and an official inquiry 
in 2004, most protagonists went unpunished.
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Is Goldenberg unique in the history of Kenya? Can this corruption case be 
compared to the scandals that were revealed in the regimes that followed? 
This is one of the questions that torments Michela Wrong in her study of 
the Anglo-Leasing Company scandal instigated by President Kibaki’s close 
acquaintances in the early 2000s. If we compare these two cases of high-level 
corruption, what should first be emphasised is that the amounts embezzled 
are not the same at all. It is difficult to reach the heights of Goldenberg. 
However, Michela Wrong (2009, 166) estimates the cost of overbilling 
by the Anglo-Leasing Company at close to 5% of GNP and 16% of state 
expenditure for 2003–04, in a context of solid economic growth, whereas 
Goldenberg took place in a phase of intense economic crisis. In the case of 
the 1990s scandal, the mechanisms for misappropriating public money were 
complex. From the 2000s, the techniques of high-level corruption became 
much more basic (over-invoicing, rigged public procurement tenders…). The 
media now disclose such cases with great efficiency. Yet, parliamentary and 
judicial inquiries are generally conducted without leading to convictions. 
Since 2018, the fight against high-level corruption has seemed to be more 
engaged but it is still too early to diagnose a change in policy.
Notes
a.  Delphis Bank belonged to Ketan Somia who had many common economic 
interests with the Moi family, Nicolas Biwott and Vice-President Saitoti.
b.  This is just the tip of the iceberg as Kanyotu and Pattni developed multiple 
speculations as part of Goldengerg: it is said that the Exchange Bank speculated 
on currencies; and the two schemers played on multiple compensation funds 
(Wrong 2009, 62–63).
c. The bulk of the information came from David Munyakei, an employee of the 
Central Bank of Kenya. On the story of one of the most important whistle-blowers 
of contemporary Kenya, see Kahora (2008).
financial support of the Western powers. Since the early 1980s, Kenya has 
negotiated many structural adjustment plans (SAPs). It accepted the loans 
but did not comply with the majority of conditionalities that the IGOs 
sought to impose. We know that the IMF, like the World Bank, explain the 
“permanent crisis” (van de Walle, 2001) situation of the African economies 
as governance problems. The centralisation of power, the notion of imperial 
presidency, the alleged failure of development policy by the state are called 
into question in favour of policies of liberalisation of the economy (including 
privatisation of public enterprises, sharp staffing decreases within the civil 
service, autonomy of the central banks, more orthodox monetary policy…) 
and rationalisation of administrative work.
Kenya has regularly eluded some of the constraints of the SAPS and donors 
have continued to lend to the country because the political leaders have 
made themselves indispensable to the United Nations system, for example 
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in 1991–92 when more than 400,000 refugees crossed over the border with 
Somalia. At other times, Kenya exploited the lack of coordination between 
the IMF and the World Bank.21 Thus, privatisation of public enterprises was 
limited (and it often benefited the Kalenjin elite) and the state structures 
controlling most agricultural sectors were not liberalised, particularly in the 
sensitive, grain sector. However, the state administration underwent severe 
reforms. The Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) I of 1993 was supposed 
to improve the productivity of the state by injecting many techniques of 
the New Public Management into this heavy machine. The main objective 
was to massively downsize the workforce through a program of voluntary 
retirement and the abolition of more than 26,000 posts. The civil servant 
identification system was improved to combat the scourge of “ghost 
workers.” But CSRP I did not have the expected results and the state did not 
become more efficient.22
The SAPs, like the administrative reforms, are commonly presented 
as failures. Nevertheless, can we speak of a “lost decade,” because of a 
particularly low rate of economic growth?23 Morten Jerven (2014: 120) is 
more reserved: “It is not obvious that Kenya performed badly during the 
Moi era and it is even less obvious that it did so because of economic 
policy. During the Moi era, Kenya performed considerably better than the 
African average.”
3. In Search of a Developmental State
With the political alternation of 2002, the economic situation improved 
rapidly. Investors had more confidence in the Government of National 
Unity that was put in place. More orthodox macroeconomic policies also 
allowed a return of growth which went from 1% in 2002 to 7% in 2007. 
The ambitious Kenya’s Vision 2030 program launched in June  2008 set 
medium-term goals. In the words of President Mwai Kibaki, this program 
was “a roadmap for accelerating the transformation of our country into a 
rapidly industrializing middle-income nation by the year 2030” (quoted by 
Adam & al. 2010, 1). The political and administrative actors and, to a lesser 
extent, the business community perceived it as a change of reference. They 
21. On the various tactics of the Kenyan state during the negotiations with the 
IMF and the World Bank, see Murunga (2007).
22. According to the World Bank (2001), this failure is due to the usual wage 
increases that teacher unions obtain before each general election. In addition, 
shortly before the 2007 poll, a strong wave of recruitment of new officials called 
into question the effects of the reform.
23. Kempe Ronald Hope (2013) recalls in particular that growth was negative 
(-1%) in 1992 and 0% in 1993 and 1997. He uses data from the World Bank that 
many economists currently challenge.
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looked to Asia for their new model of development. Elsje Fourie (2015), 
who interviewed the designers of Vision 2030, highlights their fascination 
for Singapore and Malaysia as well as China. In a conception close to the 
modernisation theory of the 1950–1960s, they believe that a number of 
steps and recipes need to be followed to catch up with the Asian Tigers. 
Where the IMF and the World Bank recommended slimming down the state, 
democratising political regimes and relying primarily on private actors to 
develop an economy open to globalisation, the Asian model emphasises the 
crucial importance of the state in guiding an economy that is placed at the 
service of the national project—not necessarily a democratic one.
Without deluding ourselves about this doctrinal change, this episode 
must be situated in “the history of extraversion” (Leguil-Bayart 1999) of 
the state in Africa. Kenyan leaders, like those in neighbouring countries, 
are seeking to gain some leeway in relation to the Western powers and the 
United Nations system. They want to depend less on international aid since 
they can borrow amply from Chinese banks that do not impose political 
conditionalities and whose more or less transparent procedures favour 
the financing of certain patron-client networks. This new strategy takes 
the form of massive investments in large-scale projects (Fouéré & Maupeu 
2015): modernisation of the North Corridor (Mombasa-Africa of the Great 
Lakes) by developing highways, fully renovating the rail transport system, 
developing Internet cabling…; creation of a new transport corridor, LAPSSET 
(Lamu Port—South Sudan—Ethiopia Transport); increase in electricity 
production and its widespread distribution throughout the country… This 
also requires a strong use of public-private partnerships (PPPs).24
Vision 2030 has long made unanimity among Kenya’s elites. Francis 
Muthaura, the head of Civil Service, at the launch of the program, 
explained this popularity by two factors. First, Vision 2030 was conceived 
during the first Kibaki presidency, when the government included the 
main tendencies of the political spectrum. Many leaders of the opposition 
participated in its genesis. In addition, this national development project 
closely associated all the representative groups of the private sector.25 
However, since 2015, the focus of this program on “mega projects” has 
24. We are only talking about the economic component of this plan. The growth 
thus created is meant to serve particularly ambitious social objectives: achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals (in the area of education, health, access to 
running water, sanitation facilities); develop housing for the general public; 
fight for true equality between the sexes… (Otieno & Nd’ung’u 2010).
25. Mathaura, Francis. 2018. “Vision 2030 Holds the Key to a Better and More 
Inclusive Kenya.” Saturday Nation, 9  June. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-
opinion/opinion/vision-2030-holds-the-key-to-a-better-and-more-inclusive-
kenya-52474 [archive]
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given rise to increasing vivid criticisms. The debate has been led by experts 
from the opposition. Patrick Mbataru recognises that infrastructure 
development promotes long-term growth, but regrets that these building 
projects are monopolised by large Chinese companies and do not include 
local companies.26 The influential analyst David Ndii warns against over-
indebtedness and recommends putting the focus on infrastructure that 
improves the lives and productivity of small-scale producers.27 This led 
major international financial analysis firms, such as Frost & Sullivan, to 
release reports that defend the relevance of the Kenyan government’s 
strategy.28 Yet, during the 2017 election campaign, the opposition rallied 
around a position hostile to the mega infrastructure projects29 that would 
prevent state investment in the social sector.
With ten years of hindsight, the effects of the Vision 2030 program are 
gradually becoming apparent. In 2018, the anniversary of the program 
was not widely celebrated. Undeniably, the Kenyan economy has changed 
but tensions remain intense. Peter Kagwanja, who was involved in the 
genesis of this development strategy, underlines the multiple indicators of 
economic growth as follows:
Kenya’s economy has expanded from GDP of Sh 1.3 trillion in 2002 to Sh 7.8 
trillion in 2017, with its GDP per capita expanding from Sh 27,000 to Sh 166,000. 
Its paved road network has expanded from 8,938 kilometers to 11,796. (…) The 
country’s electric power has grown from 1,142 MW to 2,264 MW, increasing 
its capacity to power industrialisation and enabling to connect 5.9  million 
households to the national electricity grid, up from 0.48 million in 2002.30
Let’s add that some large-scale infrastructure projects have been 
completed: the high-speed train between Mombasa and Nairobi; the 
modernisation of the port of Mombasa, which has tripled its cargo handling 
26. Mbataru, Patrick. 2015. “Mega Projects Have Little Impact on the Poor.” 
Sunday Nation, 9  August. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/
mega-projects-have-little-impact-on-the-poor-1118308 [archive].
27. Ndii, David. 2016. “Mega Projects and Hollow Men: What $50 bn Can Do for a 
Nation.” Saturday Nation, 30 January. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/
opinion/mega-projects-and-hollow-men-what-50-bn-can-do-to-a-nation-1165482 
[archive].
28. Kariuki, James. 2015. “Big Projects Recipe for Kenya’s Growth: Study.” Daily 
Nation, 13 August.
29. Ndii, David. 2017. “Forget About Mega Projects and Address Everyday Woes.” 
Saturday Nation, 29  July. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/
forget-about-mega-projects-and-address-everyday-woes-430904 [archive].
30. Kagwanja, Peter. 2018. “Kenya’s Vision 2030 Caught Between the Rock and 





capacity in ten years; a new deep-water port is under construction in Lamu; 
and the expansion of airports allows twice as many passengers as in 2002. 
The state budget increased considerably, as has its tax-raising capacity from 
202 billion KES in 2002 to 1,365 KES in 2017. This rapid development of the 
economy has been accompanied by anxieties and sometimes conflicts. New 
patterns of inequality are emerging. This is clearly visible in the regions 
affected by the large-scale works policies, and therefore primarily in the 
vast north and the north-east of the country, the agro-pastoral areas that 
until then had remained on the fringes, if not totally apart. The LAPSSET 
project (Lapsset Corridor Development Authority) aims to integrate these 
areas into the nation and to connect them to neighbouring countries 
through a network of infrastructure.
LAPSSET as a Major National Integration Policy of the North-East
The ambitious LAPSSET program, inaugurated in 2012, is now facing 
external and national constraints that were not anticipated. Adrian Browne 
summarises the situation as follows:
In its original and most ambitious imagined form, the LAPSSET corridor project 
would be transformative, enormously expensive, and very invasive, linking a 
major new port development on Kenya’s Indian Ocean coast to South Sudan 
and Ethiopia with an oil pipeline, railway and highway. Current circumstances 
make it unlikely that the pipeline will reach South Sudan or that the railway 
will be completed within this decade (Browne 2015, 5).
LAPSSET was designed primarily to develop an oil economy by 
making the best use of South Sudan’s reserves, as well as of new deposits 
discovered in north-eastern Kenya and Uganda. Ethiopia saw it as a way 
to export the electricity generated by dams on the Nile. Since 2014, the 
fall in international oil prices has called into question the viability of the 
project. Above all, the geopolitics of the region have undermined the whole 
program. South Sudan has been locked in a long-lasting civil war and 
has had no short-term need for a new pipeline. In 2017, Uganda and the 
company Total decided to build a pipeline passing through Tanzania to the 
port of Tanga. This plan was less costly than the LAPSSET solution, more 
viable from the point of view of the safety of the areas crossed, and it could 
contribute to the development of a central corridor between Dar es Salaam 
and the Great Lakes region of Africa that would be highly desirable for 
better integrating regionally Burundi and Rwanda in particular. The last 
nail in the LAPSSET coffin came from the Horn of Africa. Reconciliation 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as the agreements with Somaliland to 
develop a transport corridor between their deep-water port and Ethiopia 
made the port of Lamu less attractive. Finally, Ethiopia has never been 
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so accessible. It cleverly negotiated multiple accesses to the sea without 
depending on a single country.
Thus, one can understand why LAPSSET has so far reached few 
achievements. Yet paradoxically, the problems come less from ongoing or 
finished projects than they do from more distant and nebulous projects.
Hassan H. Kochore (2016) studied the social effects of the construction 
of the Isiolo-Moyale road which had just been completed at the time of his 
research. He wanted to test the validity of the thesis commonly accepted 
in academic circles according to which “technologies that lead from capital 
cities to the regions (…) are seen to have the power to bring development, 
progress, national inclusion and security” (Kochore 2016, 394). On the 
one hand, Kochore confirms the enchanted vision of the consequences of 
road infrastructures. Along this road, the distribution and quality of public 
services improved, particularly in terms of security, a particularly sensitive 
problem in this part of Kenya. Strong economic growth was quickly 
felt (better profitability of livestock; development of trade…). Moyale 
and especially Marsabit experienced exponential urbanisation. All the 
populations of these areas felt more attached to Kenya, but have they really 
become Kenyan? Kochore brings a nuanced answer to this question. Like 
Adeline Masquelier, he believes that the roads represent “an iconic space 
that condenses the histories gone by” (Masquelier 2002, 830). He shows that 
the state penetration also produces anxieties linked to the conflictual past 
that these populations have had with state power since colonial times.
In fact, all along the LAPSSET route, the project and the initial 
construction sites it brought about became issues that easily could cause 
tension. In Lamu, the development of a new port led to increased land 
speculation and antagonisms over the influx of labour from other parts of 
Kenya. Since the 2013 local elections, political elites have dangerously used 
the ideology of autochthony and reignited tensions with the communities 
from the hinterland that have farmed there since the 1960s. Local cells of 
the Somali Al-Shabaab movement have skilfully used the frustrations of the 
region and multiplied the attacks in Mpeketoni, targeting exclusively the 
Christian families of farmers from the Kenyan highlands. On the island of 
Lamu itself, the project to build a coal-fired power plant has met with a lot 
of resistance and given rise to various types of manifestations.
In the LAPSSET project, the corridor is supposed to split at Isiolo where 
one route goes to Ethiopia and the other to the west to South Sudan. The 
construction of the city’s airport in an area disputed by two counties has for 
years been the cause of intense armed tensions between Boran, Meru and 
Somali youth gangs. In the city itself, each community tries to control land 
(by obtaining land titles) and to ethnically homogenise the neighbourhoods 
where they are dominant. Relations between the local authorities and the 
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LAPSSET administration are often tense because the exact routes of the 
corridor’s roads tend to change under the pressure from different pressure 
groups.31 Beyond the geopolitical complexity of LAPSSET, economists opt 
for an optimist reading of the ambitious Kenyan policy for large-scale 
works, notably giving credit to the progress of the SGR project.
Mombasa-Nairobi-Naivasha-Kisumu Standard Gauge Railway 
(SGR), the Spearhead of the Large-Scale Construction Policy
In East Africa, large-scale infrastructure projects are usually integrated 
into a transport corridor system (Fouéré & Maupeu 2015). The construction 
of a new railway between Mombasa and Malaba, on the Ugandan border, 
which is to continue towards Rwanda, DRC and South Sudan, aimed to 
revitalise the northern corridor, which remains the main access route to 
the Great Lakes. But it competes with the corridor from Dar es Salaam, on 
which major investments have been made and which Uganda has favoured. 
Uganda plans to route both its railway and its pipeline through Tanzania, as 
this provides shorter and easier access to the Indian Ocean. This calls into 
question the viability of the SGR beyond Nakuru—as illustrated by China’s 
reluctance to fund the section between Naivasha and Kisumu.32
However, the Makadara Express that has been running between Mombasa 
and Nairobi since June 2017 was initially presented as an economic success 
that could bring to the country more than one point of annual growth. 
The construction of this route has been the biggest state investment since 
independence and President Uhuru Kenyatta saw it as the symbol of the 
success of his first term. In fact, this program revealed certain characteristics 
of the governance style of the government team in place. In 2009, Kenya 
rejected the low-cost option advocated by the World Bank of renovating 
the existing railway. A new route—diesel powered—was chosen whereas 
neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and Ethiopia favoured electrical 
systems that allow for faster travel.33 Shortly after construction began, 
controversies arose over the legality of the call for tender used to choose 
31. Jebet, Vivian. 2018. “Isiolo Leaders Allege Diversion of Lapsset Route, Want 
Details of Map.” Daily Nation, 19 September.
32. Marete, Gitonga. 2018. “Questions on Viability of SGR Refuse to Go 
away after China Cuts Funding.” Daily Nation, 17  September. https://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/news/Questions-on-viability-of-SGR-refuse-to-go-
away/539546-4761886-5fq1awz/index.html [archive].
33. The Kenyan system allows travellers to be transported at nearly 120 km/h 
and goods at 80 km/h. This leads to substantial time savings compared to the old 
arrangement. Apparently, a system of electrification of the lines was planned but 
it was called into question (Olingo, Allan. 2018. “Kenya Halts Plans for Electric 
Trains.” The East African, 27 January–2 February).
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the companies involved in the construction. In Parliament, two committees 
investigated this issue. The Public Investments Committee raised doubts 
regarding how the public works contract bidding was organised. Its 
hearings mainly disclosed a lot of information. There was no competitive 
bidding because the Chinese state financed the bulk of the project through 
a 3.23 billion USD loan. The China Road and Bridge Corporation that was 
chosen was apparently blacklisted by the World Bank. It was selected for 
both the project management and the construction, while the recommended 
practices encouraged dissociating the two. And the cost of the project 
proved to be much higher than its Ethiopian equivalent. It is said the rate 
of the bank loans signed were uncompetitive.34 Many elected members 
of the Public Investments Committee saw this as evidence of high-level 
corruption. Conversely, the Parliamentary Committee on Transport, Public 
Works and Housing considered that the procedures had been respected and 
that there was no reason to suspect embezzlement.35
Some political scientists interpret the different positions of the two 
commissions as the result of factions within the political elite. The Public 
Investments Committee was dominated by the camp of Vice-President 
William Ruto, who himself expressed reservations about the SGR tender. 
During the hearings, those close to him engaged in the most virulent 
attacks. The Transport Commission, just like the very lucrative Ministry 
of Transport, was run and controlled by people from the Central Province 
linked to the Kibaki and Kenyatta networks. This suggests that the leaders 
close to Ruto benefited too little from the patron-client redistribution linked 
to the SGR and made it known…
Two other anti-corruption agencies (the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the Public Accounts Committee) investigated the SGR 
construction contracts.36 Since the 2010 constitution, several Independent 
Administrative Authorities have specialised in the fight against corruption. 
The new charter also guarantees a more independent judiciary. Yet despite 
this institutional progress, very large public works contracts remain 
opaque and neither administrative actors nor parliamentary commissions 
can effectively control the procedures.
34. Notably, Juma, Victor. 2014. “Making of a Mega Scandal? Why Railway 
Figures Do Not Add up.” Sunday Nation, 26 January. https://nation.africa/kenya/
news/making-of-a-mega-scandal-why-railway-figures-do-not-add-up-942286 
[archive].
35. The boss of this Commission in 2014–2015, Maina Kamanda, became the 
Minister of Transport.
36. Njagi, John, and John Ngirachu. 2014. “Graft Team Opens Probe on Rail 
Deal.” Daily Nation, 8 January.
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Yet, the Mombasa-Nairobi line was built in due time, despite tensions at 
the time of the purchase of the land necessary for this route,37 strikes by 
local workforce,38 and discontent by politicians that the obligation to use 
local companies (for 40% of the supply) was respected.39 The management of 
passenger transport was entrusted to a Chinese company accused of failing 
to effectively train its Kenyan employees and of having racist practices.40 
Freight transport began in early 2018. It was planned that at least one third 
of freight and in particular the heaviest containers would be transported by 
rail in order to avoid overloading the rapidly deteriorating roads. But the 
success of this policy depended and will continue to depend heavily on the 
competitiveness of the rail transport prices.41
Water and Large-Scale Works
In keeping with the Vision 2030 policy, the Kenyan government focused 
on water resources development. This involved planning the construction 
of many large dams on the main rivers of the country. All regions are due 
to benefit from these infrastructure works generally aimed at producing 
electricity and developing irrigated agriculture.42 For example, the Thiba 
Dam (Kirinyaga county) is expected to double rice production in the region. 
And the High Grand Falls Dam on the Tana River, in Kitui and Tharaka 
Nithi counties, should bring nearly 250,000  hectares of irrigation to the 
Kitui, Garissa and Tana River counties.
At the local level, these projects are presented as vectors of general 
development because they are expected to have a positive impact on 
many areas. For example, the Thwake Multi-Purpose Dam in Makueni 
37. Kairu, Pauline. 2014. “Land Owners Along Rail Route Want Fresh Valuation.” 
Sunday Nation, 28 December.
38. Maundu, Pius. 2015. “Workers at New Railway on Strike.” Daily Nation, 
9  April. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/workers-at-new-railway-on-
strike-1083358 [archive].
39. Karambu, Immaculate. 2015. “Uhuru Faults SGR Contractor on 40pc 
Procurement Quota.” Daily Nation, 5 December.
40. Wafula, Paul. 2018. “Exclusive: Behind the SGR Walls.” The Standard, 8 July. 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001287119/exclusive-behind-
the-sgr-walls [archive].
41. In 2018, the company that manages the rail freight has lowered its 
prices twice in order to compete effectively with road transport. The state is 
encouraging importers to use the train by organising the customs clearance of 
goods at Embakasi, near Nairobi.
42. During Jubilee’s (the President’s party) election campaign in 2017, Uhuru 
Kenyatta promised to build 57 dams during his tenure, at least four of them 
being large dams (or “mega dams”).
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and Kutui counties is aimed to intensify economic and social exchanges 
between the two counties. Roads are to be built and economic structures 
(especially cooperatives) are to be promoted that will affect both counties. 
At the national level, the dams are due to contribute to producing more 
electricity but also to strengthening food security43 which, as we will see 
later, has been one of the main objectives of Kenyatta’s second presidential 
term. But the management of large irrigated areas will be complicated. 
Thus, for decades, the rice-growing region of Mwea has been plagued 
by a number of setbacks that the Thiba Dam will not necessarily solve. 
The Galana-Kulalu Irrigation Project, officially inaugurated in early 2014, 
is intended to develop irrigation on more than one million acres in the 
Tana River and Kilifi counties, but this program is increasingly looking 
like a white elephant. A report from the Auditor-General noted massive 
misappropriation of funds.44 Many NGOs denounce the negative impact of 
this project on the environment and, above all, the local communities reject 
this structure that has been imposed upon on them.45
The many conflicts over water use illustrate Kenya’s difficult management 
of its resources as common goods because multiple communities claim to 
embody the public interest. In the mountains, too much water is collected 
by the local populations and these water towers are drying up, threatening 
the survival of all the rivers in the country.46 In order to supply the 
capital city with drinking water, a vast system of water conveyance from 
the slopes of Mount Kenya is currently being built, but the governor of 
Murang’a county promised to stop these works if 25% of the water sale is 
not returned to the local authority, on the grounds that the Ndakai-ini Dam 
(the main water supply for Nairobi) is located in the Murang’a county.47 In 
43. Apollo, Silas. 2017. “Ministry Rolls out Dam Projects to Boost Food 
Production.” Daily Nation, 26  December. https://nation.africa/news/Govt-rolls-
out-57-dam-project-to-boost-food-production/1056-4242428-format-xhtml-
bvfav0/index.html [archive].
44. Report of the Auditor-General on the Financial Statements of National 
Irrigation Board. 30 June 2016. Nairobi: Republic of Kenya.
45. Lwanga, Charles. 2018. “Kilifi MCAs Move to Push State out of Galana-Kulalu 
Project.” Business Daily, 1  March. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/
counties/Kilifi-MCAs-stop-Galana-Kulalu-project/4003142-4324908-148c21lz/
index.html [archive].
46. Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “How Greed for Water and Impunity Pushing a 
Community to the Brink.” Daily Nation, 25  August. https://nation.africa/
kenya/news/how-greed-for-water-and-impunity-pushing-a-community-to-the-
brink-80648 [archive]. The removal of forests in these water towers also helps to 
dry up the waterways.
47. Gachane, Ndung’u. 2018. “Now Wa Iria Slaps Nairobians with Water Levy as 
Revenue Row Escalates.” Daily Nation, 14 September. https://nation.africa/kenya/
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a context where decentralisation is proving to be particularly popular, local 
elected representatives are called upon to best defend the interests of their 
communities, particularly with regard to the central state.48 The demands 
of Kikuyu leaders are nothing exceptional. For example, Kipsigis elected 
representatives are campaigning for the tea multinationals operating in 
their region to pay 25% of their profits to their county. The political class 
has obviously learned from the Turkana experience. We will see below that 
the Turkana obtained that 25% of the revenue from oil produced in their 
region go back to the population.
Kenya and the Oil Economy
In the 2000s, the main countries of East Africa moved towards becoming 
gas or hydrocarbon producers. Tanzania has huge gas reserves, especially 
in the south-east of the country. Ethiopia signed contracts to build a gas 
pipeline for transportation to the port of Djibouti. In 2018, it launched 
the first production tests of the Ogaden oil.49 Uganda has the largest oil 
reserves in the region. They are estimated at 6.5 billion barrels, while South 
Sudan is estimated to have nearly 3.5 billion barrels and Kenya has only 
a meagre potential of 754 million barrels.50 As the Institute of Economic 
Affairs points out, oil in the whole of East Africa accounts for only 0.63% 
of world reserves.51 Apart from Uganda, no country in the region can hope 
to become self-sufficient in fuel. However, this sector triggers a very strong 
interest in many circles. Political elites see it as a great opportunity for 
political financing and personal enrichment. The media, many NGOs, 
associations and other civil society groups, not to mention pressure groups, 
fuel numerous debates that interest and shape public opinion. Some 
countries in the region are continually postponing the exploitation of their 
resources. This is the case of Tanzania and Uganda. Others, on the contrary, 
are starting small scale production. Ethiopia comes to mind, as does Kenya, 
a country that has been striving since 2018 to truck its first barrels to the 
news/wa-iria-slaps-nairobians-with-water-levy-as-revenue-row-escalates-86672 
[archive].
48. Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “Water Row: Leaders Break Ranks with Jubilee.” Daily 
Nation, 5 October.
49. Keprop, Victor. 2018. “Ethiopia Begins Production Tests at Ogaden Oilfield.” 
The East African, 30 June–6 July. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/
ethiopia-begins-production-tests-at-ogaden-oilfield-1397200 [archive].8.
50. These are the estimates retained by the World Bank in its recent reports.
51. IEA (Institute of Economics Affairs). 2018. “How much Oil? Why East Africa’s 
Bounty Is neither Significant nor Exceptional.” The East African, 9–15  June. 
https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/how-much-oil-why-east-africa-
s-bounty-is-neither-significant-nor-exceptional--1395812 [archive]..
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port of Mombasa over more than 1,000 km. In this area, political calculations 
count as much as economic logic.
The debates and tensions in this sector differ from one country to another. 
In Uganda and Tanzania, it is the Heads of State themselves who engage in 
an often tough dialogue with multinationals. They negotiate concessions 
on revenues, tax rates and calculation, infrastructure financing, and 
refinery development. In Kenya, oil is not the preserve of the President, 
especially as the main discussions are about the sharing of the income 
between the central state, local governments and local communities living 
in the production areas. In 2014, the preparatory work on the legislation 
to govern the sector envisaged that almost 40% would go to the counties 
and populations of the production area. A significant part of the revenues 
was also to be incorporated into an investment fund for medium and 
long-term investments. This idea was inspired by Norwegian practices 
adopted by some African producers, such as Ghana, to avoid the famous 
“resource curse.” After an initial bill was passed by Parliament which the 
President refused to validate, the government agreed in 2018 to a sharing 
formula granting 75% to the state, 20% to the county, and 5% to the local 
communities. But when the state starting transporting the first barrels of 
oil to the coast, it was immediately blocked for several weeks as local elites 
were unhappy with the terms of the income sharing. These elites also 
demanded an improvement in the security situation and infrastructure. In 
early July, an agreement was signed and the first oil barrels were delivered. 
The government justified this early exploitation strategy by the desire to 
test the supply of logistics and to determine the price of this crude on 
the world market.52 This would also be a way of getting private investors 
interested in the construction of the pipeline between Turkana and Lamu.
In recent years, public policy on oil production has been structured 
around multiple actors with different visions. The state is trying to establish 
itself as the undisputed leader but so far, these tensions highlight above all 
the lack of transparency. Another sector of the oil economy where there 
are strong suspicions of corruption is transport. Transporting imported 
petroleum products (gasoline…) faster, cheaper and in larger quantities 
is becoming a vital economic issue. For ten years, domestic demand for 
refined oil has exploded. In neighbouring landlocked countries, economic 
growth is fuelling strong energy needs. Kenya has an interest in satisfying 
these markets. So far, gasoline has been the third most important export 
52. Otuki, Neville. 2018. “Oil Billions Not Our Major Aim for Now, Says PS 





product after tea and cut flowers (13% of export earnings). But here again, 
competition from the central corridor through Tanzania has been fierce.
The development of this sector depends on the efficiency of one public 
enterprise (wholly-owned by the state): the Kenya Pipeline Company 
(KPC). Long presented as a sleeping beauty, it has been real dynamic in 
recent years. The 40-year-old Mombasa-Nairobi pipeline was rebuilt at a 
cost of 484  million  USD. It can carry over one third more oil compared 
to the old structure. A new pipeline between Sinendet (Nakuru County) 
and Kisumu was inaugurated in 2018. It complements an older facility and 
allows the volume being transported to be tripled. This will have positive 
effects on the development of the whole of Western Kenya, a region that 
is rapidly urbanising and has a high demand for petroleum products. In 
addition, it will facilitate export to Uganda.
KPC is also promoting a decentralisation strategy for the pipelines. In 
the short term, several structures are expected to reach seven counties in 
the periphery and, most importantly, it is planned to develop large fuel 
depots with a volume of 20 million litres in the main cities of Kenya. In 
a country where the price of oil is different from region to region, these 
investments by KPC should significantly lower the price of transport and 
limit seasonal speculation.
Nevertheless, KPC’s policy faces resistance. First, its projects are 
regularly delayed because of multiple anti-corruption procedures. In a 
sector that handles a lot of money, and suspicions of misappropriation 
of funds are permanent. In addition, pressure groups hostile to these 
large-scale construction works use the control commissions to curb the 
development of the oil infrastructure. It is common knowledge that the 
road transport of fuel is controlled by large families of the political elite 
(notably the Moi clan for transport from Eldoret to Uganda) who do not 
appreciate the multiplication of pipelines. Finally, at the regional level, the 
Mombasa-Busia line should be extended across the border to Uganda and 
Rwanda. This project, strongly supported by the World Bank and Kenya, is 
met with indifference from neighbouring countries.53
The policy of large-scale construction promoted by Presidents Kibaki 
and Kenyatta has borne fruits. At least vital infrastructure has been built. 
But it is not certain that this policy of large-scale public investment will 
last.
53. Olingo, Allan. 2018. “No Pledges for Region’s Pipeline, Open Sky Deals.” The 
East African, 30 June–6 July. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/no-
pledges-for-region-s-pipeline-open-sky-deals-1397178 [archive].
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4. Uhuru Kenyatta and the Big Four Agenda (2017–…)
Upon his re-election at the end of 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta 
announced his intention to place his second term in office under the 
umbrella of a new national development program, the Big Four Agenda. 
He aimed to focus public spending on certain areas deemed crucial: low-
income family housing, universal health insurance, guaranteed food 
security for all Kenyans, and increased production capacity of domestic 
industries. This new program was presented as a personal initiative of the 
Head of State to make his mark. Throughout 2018, the media resituated 
the promotion of the Big Four Agenda within the growing divide between 
the President and the Vice-President. An anti-corruption campaign was 
launched and particularly affected William Ruto’s camp.54 The Kenyatta 
team was intent on presenting Ruto as the preeminent representative 
of the sins of the previous era and thus of rampant grand corruption. In 
this context, the Big Four Agenda program was supposed to restore the 
reputation of the Head of State… and give him room for manoeuvre in 
his upcoming succession. In many ways, the 2022 election campaign has 
already begun. It is still too early to give informed opinion on this new 
frame of reference for Kenyan public policy. We can only suggest a number 
of questions: does this program call into question the policy of large-scale 
works that characterised the first term in office of Uhuru Kenyatta? Is 
the Big Four Agenda compatible with the major decentralisation reform 
implemented since 2013? Should we believe in this development project or 
is it just a political communication exercise?
End of the Large-Scale Works Policy?
The Head of State announced that there would be no new large-
scale construction projects during his last term. Priority was given to 
completing the works already started. It is true that roads, dams and public 
buildings started years ago and abandoned are commonplace. However, 
the President’s promises only engaged him because mega projects have 
a strong international dimension. In this area, Kenya’s decisions are 
conditioned by a regional context from which it cannot escape. Thus, it 
should take into consideration Ethiopia’s firm desire to develop programs 
of interest to both countries (Moyale Joint City and Economic Zone 
Project; the Lamu–Garissa–Isiolo–Moyale and Moyale–Hawassa–Addis 
54. On the subject, see the analyses of one of the finest commentators of Kenyan 
political life, Opanga, Kwenda. 2018. “Big Four Agenda and 2022: Reasons Uhuru 





Ababa roads…).55 Moreover, Kenya benefits greatly from its geographical 
position on the Northern Corridor (Mombasa-Africa of the Great Lakes) 
but the modernisation of this major axis requires heavy investments 
involving several countries.56 The development of the LAPSSET corridor 
implies that Kenya be responsive to the needs of its neighbours as well as 
their schedules. Nevertheless, Kenya has limited room for manoeuvre. It 
cannot easily envisage any new large-scale projects in the medium term. 
Chinese loans seem to be drying up. In September 2018, China refused to 
participate in the financing of the construction of the railway between 
Nairobi and the Ugandan border even though Chinese companies had 
developed the section between Mombasa and Nairobi.57 In fact, Kenya is the 
most indebted country in the region. It is seeking to reduce its dependence 
on Asian loans. This was the objective of using Eurobonds, but it was done 
at a high political cost.58
For years, the governing team argued that the policy of large-scale 
construction was a source of economic growth. The opposition believed 
55. Olingo, Allan, and Victor Kiprop. 2018. “Ethiopia Reaches Out to Djibouti 
and Kenya to Partner on Mega Projects.” The East African, 12 May. https://www.
theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/ethiopia-reaches-out-to-djibouti-and-kenya-
to-partner-on-mega-projects--1393546 [archive].
56. The high level of public debt of all East African countries brings the risk 
of debt crisis, which leads these countries to limit their spending ambitions. 
Wanzala, Ouma. 2018. “Cash Crunch Hits EAC Integration Projects.” Daily Nation, 
26  June. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/cash-crunch-hits-eac-integration-
projects-59296 [archive].
57. Marete, Gitonga. 2018. “Questions on Viability of SGR Refuse to Go 
Away After China Cuts Funding.” Daily Nation, 17  September. https://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/news/Questions-on-viability-of-SGR-refuse-to-go-
away/539546-4761886-5fq1awz/index.html [archive]. Since a few years, many 
African countries have had great difficulty repaying their loans.
58. In 2014, Kenya raised 2.8 billion USD in Eurobonds. In early 2018, it took 
over 2 billion USD, officially to give the country a little air to breath during the 
repayment of public debt. The opposition believes that some funds disappeared 
and would have served as a bail out with regards to the exorbitant cost of Jubilee's 
election campaign (the party of the President). Mwaniki, Charles. 2018. “Kenya 
Raises $2bn in Fresh Eurobonds Issue.” Business Daily, 22 February. https://www.
businessdailyafrica.com/markets/capital/Kenya-says-fresh--2bn-Eurobond-
oversubscribed-seven-times/4259442-4315350-14pr01l/index.html [archive]. On 
the doubts held by the opposition, see the always brilliant and enlightened 
analyses by David Ndii: Ndii, David. 2015. “If It Looks, Quacks and Walks Like 
a Duck, It Is the Lies About Eurobond.” Saturday Nation, 19 December. https://
www.nation.co.ke/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/if-it-looks-quacks-and-walks-
like-a-duck-it-is-the-lies-about-eurobond-1155142 [archive].
Recently, China seemed less willing to invest in Kenya, as Kenya is getting clo-
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that, if it produced growth at all, it was unequal growth. Above all, 
these massive investments prevented the development of social policies, 
particularly in the area of social protection. Apparently, the elite in power 
today are now listening to these criticisms. In doing so, they are joining a 
certain economic orthodoxy which believes that:
genuine public assets, the transport infrastructures generate externalities, 
as positive as they are negative (noise, accidents, pollution, destruction of 
landscapes, shared uses, etc.) and do not seem to offer a short-term economic 
return for the sponsoring authorities. This lack of immediate economic 
benefits—apart from those related to the construction itself, for the state 
operated enterprises potentially involved—is nevertheless counterbalanced by 
a political benefit (Carcanague & Hache 2017, 56–57). 
Yet, this political benefit has now been much reduced. Several polls show 
that these large-scale construction works do not bring significant gains in 
popularity. Material benefits for the political elite also tend to run out: 
the bribes that finance political life are reaped in the preparatory phase 
of these large-scale works. In this context, the country leaders seem to be 
more open to the idea of fostering “equitable economic growth.”59 In this 
respect, the Big Four Agenda remains true to the objectives of Kenya Vision 
2030: it aims to make Kenya a middle-income country.60 Above all, it allows 
for a redistribution that was no longer the priority of Kenya’s development 
policies. Several segments of civil society expressed support for this change 
in state priorities. Cooperatives, in particular SACCOS (Saving and Credit 
Cooperative Societies), indicated that they wished to participate actively 
in the public policies emerging from this new framework. Indeed, it seems 
difficult to develop social housing programs without involving SACCOS, 
the main providers of this type of housing.61 Kenyans in the diaspora could 
ser to the US (e.g. agreements to rebuild the road infrastructure between Mombasa 
and Nairobi…) and the UK.
59. Warutere, Peter. 2018. “Harmonise Relevant Laws for Equitable Growth.” 
Daily Nation, 31  May. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/
harmonise-relevant-laws-for-equitable-economic-growth--49308 [archive].
60. Muraya, Beth. 2018. “Will the Big Four Agenda Usher in Transformative 
Economic Growth?” Sunday Nation, 10 June.
61. Namlola, Juma. 2018. “Saccos Told to Cash In on Uhuru’s Big Four Agenda.” 
Daily Nation, 19 February; Ibid. 2018. “Co-operatives Key to Government’s Big 
Four Agenda.” Saturday Nation, 7  July; Mwololo, Millicent. 2018. “Sacco Turns 
Home Ownership Dream into Reality.” Daily Nation, 19  July. https://nation.
africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/sacco-turns-home-ownership-dream-into-
a-reality-68454 [archive]; Mwololo, Millicent. 2018. “Cooperatives to Deliver 





also fund this public policy. Their representative groups are making this 
known and calling for adapted tax policies.62 The Big Four Agenda also 
offers the prospect of new revenue for many economic agents.63
After a long career in politics, Uhuru Kenyatta has finally revealed 
his social streak. Yet, some analysts are sceptical and look for Kenyatta’s 
hidden agenda.
The Big Four Agenda as a Way to Recentralise?
The constitution of 2010 attempts to bring public decision-making closer 
to Kenyan citizens, notably through a decentralisation reform introduced 
in 2013. Despite corruption scandals and frustrations caused by new local 
governments in counties, the vast majority of Kenyans still support this 
level of governance.64 Most neighbourhood policies, which fundamentally 
affect the daily lives of citizens, fall under their jurisdiction. The four areas 
of the Big Four Agenda cut across the areas entrusted to the counties. 
Counties inherited health management and some of them have started 
to implement health insurance for all those living in their territories.65 
Food security, which also falls under their jurisdiction, tends to become 
a responsibility shared with the national government. In 2016–17, during 
62. Warutere, Peter. 2018. “Diaspora Remittances Can Fund ‘Big 4’ Affordable 
Housing Plan.” Daily Nation, 10  May. https://nation.africa/oped/opinion/
Diaspora-remittances-can-fund--Big-4---housing-plan-/440808-4553158-format-
xhtml-jctg13z/index.html [archive]. Kenyans in the diaspora transferred nearly 
USD 2.5 billion to their home country in 2018.
63. The digital industries know they will benefit from the new state program. 
And the President even asked them to invest in these sectors (Lang’at, Patrick. 
2018. “Technology to Drive My Big Four Promises, Says Uhuru.” Daily Nation, 
28  February). The chemical industries specialising in agriculture sponsor 
Farm Clinics in several provincial universities (where farmers explain their 
agricultural problems and where they are offered solutions) and nowadays place 
them under the mentorship of the Big Four agenda (Maina, Nelson. 2018. “Farm 
Clinics at Heart of Big Four Agenda.” Daily Nation, 7 July. https://nation.africa/
kenya/business/seeds-of-gold/farm-clinics-at-heart-of-big-four-agenda-63688 
[archive]). No one is fooled, many economic actors are positioning themselves to 
take advantage of future state spending (Ngugi, Brian, and Neville Otuki. 2018. 
“Faceless Cartels Lie in Wait for the Big Four Projects.” Daily Nation, 30 April).
64. Vidija, Patrick. 2018. “84% of Kenyans Support Devolution. Ipsos.” The Star, 
6 April.
65. “Kiambu County to Give Free NHIF Cover to 24,000 Families.” 2017. Daily 
Nation, 24  October; “Kisumu County Ready to Pilot Universal Healthcare.” 
2018. Daily Nation, 27 March; Komu, Nicholas. 2018. “Tharaka Nithi Launches 
TN-Care.” Daily Nation, 14 September. https://nation.africa/kenya/brand-book/
tharaka-nithi-launches-tn-care-medical-cover--111570 [archive].
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the election campaign, a long-lasting drought affected the country, putting 
many people at risk. The response of the national executive was late and 
the counties of the semi-desert areas proved to be ineffective, forcing the 
central state to take over and therefore to appear as the leader in this public 
policy. Economic assistance is a shared competence, but all governors 
particularly value their role in this area. In addition, some counties have 
come together to form economic blocs that pool resources to have a more 
incisive economic policy.66 In this context, the success of the Big Four 
Agenda depends on the establishment of strong collaborations between 
the national and local levels. In June 2018, the Governors’ Summit declared 
its willingness to work with the National Executive on these issues.67 Some 
counties negotiate directly with the Kenyan government to be involved in 
certain policies of the new agenda.68
For the moment, the doctrine of Kenya’s leadership on the place of local 
governments in the implementation of the Big Four Agenda is not known. 
For years, both Kenyatta and Ruto have expressed their hostility towards 
decentralisation. Since they have been in power, they have toned down 
their rhetoric but they are still suspected of having dark agendas against 
this reform. Some go as far as to suggest that the Big Four is their Trojan 
horse for devitalising decentralisation… But other observers believe that 
the Head of State may have an interest in working with the counties. 
He would thus establish patron-client networks that would allow him 
to manage his own succession from a position of strength, particularly 
against his Vice-President, even if he himself cannot constitutionally stand 
for re-election.
66. On the Lake Region Economic Bloc, which brings together 8 counties from 
western Kenya, see: Luvega, Derick, et Gaitano Pessa. 2018. “Eight Governors 
from Lake Region to Drum Up Support for Economic Bloc.” Saturday Nation, 
9  June. https://nation.africa/counties/Governors-to-drum-up-support-for-
economic-bloc/1107872-4602644-format-xhtml-byxs3c/index.html [archive].
67. Even if the majority of counties are run by elected members of Jubilee (the 
President’s party), the Governors’ Summit is led by an opponent of the regime 
and this body is particularly demanding if not suspicious of a national executive 
still suspected of not playing the game of the 2010 constitution sincerely. Oruko, 
Ibrahim. 2018. “State Told to Work with Counties for Big Four Success.” Daily 
Nation, 5 June. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/governors-tell-state-to-
work-with-counties-for-success-of-big-four-agenda-51230 [archive].
68. This is the case of Kitui. Mutua, Kitavi. 2018. “How Kitui Mineral Wealth Can 





Should We Believe in the Impact of the Big Four Agenda?
There are indications that the President is serious about the success of his 
new development program. Thus, many ministerial departments as well 
as several public institutions involved in the Big Four were moved to new 
ministries and new senior officials were appointed. These rearrangements 
are generally interpreted as the executive’s desire to lock down these 
crucial administrative services by putting them under the control of those 
in power.69 However, the national budget presented in mid-2018 did not 
clearly prioritise the four areas to be developed. Some MPs called it an 
“illusionist budget” in that some of the usual entries (especially in education) 
were labelled “Big Four Agenda enablers” to make it appear that the new 
budget was given a significant place to the new agenda.70 This reminds us 
of the technical constraints of all modern states budgets, which are subject 
to large amounts of expenditure and have little room for manoeuvre to 
change to envelopes allocated. Changes are made in the medium-term, but 
in a democracy, citizens must be convinced of the state’s ability to change 
the daily lives of the country’s inhabitants. Political communication must 
therefore persuade public opinion of the sincerity of those in power in their 
project of change. It is still too early to know whether the message is getting 
through and whether public action is going in the direction announced.
Conclusion
Since independence, Kenya has continuously experienced what has been 
called a developmental state. Even in times of recession, the country recorded 
economic growth rates above the continental average. The characteristics 
of its economic system have changed significantly: the majority of wealth 
is now produced by the service sector, agriculture is modernising and 
remains largely in the hands of small-scale producers… This was done 
under the leadership of the state but the ways in which it intervenes in the 
economy and in society have evolved according to external constraints, the 
administration capacity to be truly engaged, and the forms of governance 
of the successive regimes.
69. Githae, Wanjohi, et Patrick Lang’at. 2018. “Uhuru Swaps Departments as 
Focus Shifts to Big Four Agenda.” Sunday Nation, 18  February. https://nation.
africa/kenya/news/politics/uhuru-swaps-departments-as-focus-turn-to-big-
four-agenda-14174 [archive].
70. For a detailed presentation of these false pretences in the 2018-2019 budget, 
Kisero, Jaindi. 2018. “Mistake: Rotich Budget Lumped ‘Big Four’ with Usual 
Spendings.” Daily Nation, 20  June. https://nation.africa/blogs/Henry-Rotich-
Budget-lumped--Big-Four--with-usual-spending/1949942-4620960-13t2pwb/
index.html [archive].
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Until the mid-1970s, Jomo Kenyatta consolidated the strong state 
inherited from the colonial era, to which he added an important neo-
patrimonial dimension. The political and administrative elites became 
heavily involved in all sectors of the economy, notably agriculture. Because 
of genuine political pluralism, especially at the local level, the political class 
had to take citizens’ demands into account, demands which were expressed, 
notably, during relatively free elections.
During the two decades of Daniel arap Moi’s regime (1978–2002), those 
in power benefited from a narrower social base than their predecessors and 
came to rule the country with increasingly authoritarianism. They captured 
the developmental state for their own benefit and gradually established a 
real divorce with the economic forces and civil society.
The presidencies of Mwai Kibaki (2002–2013) and Uhuru Kenyatta 
took place under the seal of democratisation, despite chaotic periods—in 
particular, the 2007 general elections and the short three-month civil war 
that followed. A new social contract was established between the state and 
the economic forces; it expressed in particular in the Kenya Vision 2030 
program. During these fifteen years, the state superstructure developed 
at the same pace as the economy. Its efficiency improved considerably 
under the effects of the New Public Management techniques to which 
national elites largely converted. Yet, neo-patrimonialism still rules from 
the national to the local level, thanks in particular to the decentralisation 
reforms implemented from 2013 onwards.
Under the tutelage and often the activism of the developmental state in 
its various facets, the economy modernised and in 2015. Kenya became a 
middle-income country. This undeniable success highlighted the level of 
inequality that persisted and which, according to some, threatened the order 
that had been created. Such inequality took diverse forms but two of them 
gave rise to controversies and public policy. Indeed, the debate focused, 
on the one hand, on territorial inequalities that are understood through 
ethnicity and, on the other hand, on inequalities between social groups.
Since the 1950s, the political system has been structured around the idea 
of territorial injustices that needed to be addressed. Small ethnic groups 
that feared being left behind joined together in a partisan structure that 
negotiated with larger ethnic groups deemed dominant. The democratisation 
of the 1990s exacerbated these tensions and strongly ethnicised political 
life. Following the 2007 crisis, institutional responses were adopted: a 
decentralisation reform gave the regions substantial material resources 
and real decision-making power; a special fund was created so that the 
poorest counties would have more money available; recruitment in the 
public service had to respect a certain ethnic balance, etc. Strong territorial 
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inequalities persist but the political elites took stock of the frustrations of 
the peripheries and put in place policies that were appreciated.
Inequalities between social categories have been relatively hidden from 
the political debate. Of course, the opposition and some of its leaders, like 
Raila Odinga, present themselves as the heroes of the poor. But politics is 
read more though the lens of ethnicity than in terms of the social question. 
Anti-poverty policies have failed. The development of universal social 
protection is still in its infancy, and in this area, Kenya (and East Africa in 
general) is lagging behind Southern Africa countries. We have seen that the 
Big Four Agenda, which is to serve as a benchmark for Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
last term in office, is aimed to provide solutions. For the time being, the 
poorest sections of the population barely appear in the public sphere, 
except through the multifaceted violence of the youth. The needy remain 
in what Kristin D. Phillips (2018) calls a “citizenship of subsistence.” They 
try to survive food crises (if not famines) by becoming part of patron-client 
networks that act as a fragile form of social security.
Since its inception, the Kenyan developmental state has been able to 
create economic growth but this prosperity is very unevenly distributed; it 
does not bring social justice, and therefore its legitimacy still remains fragile. 
Here again, great hopes are placed in decentralisation as it is expected 
to bring the state and its public services closer to the citizens. But will 
Kenya have the means for this ambition? Since 2018, several reports from 
the World Bank and the IMF have warned of the sharp increase in public 
debt across East Africa. In Kenya, this debt rose from 15.4 billion EUR to 
42.7 billion EUR during Uhuru Kenyatta’s first term in office,71 in particular 
due to the policy of large-scale works. Thus, the state has lost much of its 
room for manoeuvre.
The Kenyan developmental state has many similarities with the states in 
neighbouring countries, although some are more interventionist (Ethiopia, 
Rwanda), others more focused on social justice (Tanzania), and still 
others more neo-patrimonialist (Uganda). It is likely that greater regional 
integration would be of great benefit, at least at the economic level and 
particularly in the development of the large-scale transport corridors. For 
many years, competition and suspicion have prevailed over cooperation, 
especially when it comes to Kenya—a country that would highly benefit 
from integration.
71. The share of debt in Gross Domestic Product is 58%. See Douet, Marion. 2018. 
“Au Kenya, la forte augmentation de la dette publique inquiète la population.” Le 
Monde, 13 October.
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